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ABSTRACT—Federal criminal sentencing doctrine is growing increasingly 
favorable to the prosecution. This Note identifies two factors that 
contribute to this “doctrinal drift.” First, district courts rarely issue written 
opinions in the sentencing context. Second, prosecutors, unlike defense 
attorneys, can strategically forego appeal in an individual case to avoid the 
risk that the lower court’s pro-defense reasoning will be affirmed and 
become binding precedent. In fact, 99% of all appeals of sentencing 
decisions are defense appeals. When defendants appeal pro-prosecution 
lower court decisions, the appellate court usually affirms, in part due to 
deference. The result is a one-sided body of case law, composed primarily 
of circuit court opinions affirming pro-prosecution decisions. 
Consequently, when defense attorneys draft sentencing memoranda, they 
face a dearth of precedent to support their position. Prosecutors, by 
contrast, can choose from an abundance of favorable decisions. 
Consequently, prosecution memoranda are more likely to persuade the 
court, and with each round of appeals the doctrine drifts further in the pro-
prosecution direction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This Note contends that extrajudicial factors push criminal sentencing 
doctrine in a pro-prosecution direction. Because 99% of sentencing appeals 
are defense appeals,1 appellate court opinions affirming pro-prosecution2 
1 See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
2 “Pro-prosecution” and “pro-defense” will be used throughout this Note as terms of art. The 
following example will clarify their meaning: to calculate the sentence range for a criminal defendant, 
the district court must determine the defendant’s “Offense Level” based on the offense and any 
enhancements or reductions that apply. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/
GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JF7-AX5R] (providing the chart used to determine the sentencing 
range based on the offense level and the defendant’s criminal history category). The government may 
request a four-level enhancement for the defendant’s aggravating role in the offense under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.1(a), and the defendant may argue that the aggravating role enhancement does not apply at all. If
the court finds that the defendant played an aggravating role and holds that a four-level enhancement is
warranted, this decision would, of course, be labeled pro-prosecution. Suppose, on the other hand, that
the court concludes that the defendant played an aggravating role, but holds that only a two-level
enhancement is warranted. This district court decision would be difficult to categorize as either pro-
prosecution or pro-defense because the court’s reasoning may be helpful to the prosecution (i.e.,
explaining why an enhancement is appropriate), to the defense (i.e., explaining why a four-level
enhancement would be too severe), or both. However, if the defendant appeals the district court
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criminal sentencing decisions constitute the bulk of binding precedent, 
whereas pro-defense decisions disappear into the ether. As a result, 
sentencing doctrine drifts in a pro-prosecution direction. This “doctrinal 
drift” is concerning because, unlike the much-valued evolution of the 
common law towards greater efficiency,3 this drift is not a product of 
careful judicial decisionmaking. It is instead the result of a confluence of 
extrajudicial factors completely disconnected from justice and fairness.  
This Note focuses on two extrajudicial factors in particular: (1) the 
lack of written sentencing decisions at the district court level and (2) the 
asymmetric rate of appeals between criminal defendants and prosecutors.4 
First, district courts rarely issue written sentencing decisions.5 Instead, 
courts generally issue sentencing decisions by oral pronouncement.6 
Second, double jeopardy bars prosecutors from appealing criminal 
convictions,7 but even in the sentencing context where prosecutors can 
appeal, they seldom do.8 By contrast, defense attorneys appeal a sentence 
whenever colorable grounds for appeal exist; they owe a duty to their 
decision, an appellate court decision affirming it would be labeled as pro-prosecution for the purposes 
of this Note. The reason is that the appellate court would have to address and reject the defense 
arguments as to why the enhancement is inapplicable, thereby providing favorable precedent for future 
prosecution arguments. The opposite would also be true. If the prosecution appeals and the appellate 
court affirms, the decision would be categorized as pro-defense, but this is a relatively rare occurrence. 
3 Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto and Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An 
Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 381 (2008) (“[C]ase law is a continuous, never-
ending process of evolution of legal rules that is characterized by probabilistic convergence toward 
greater efficiency and predictability . . . .”). 
4 This Note focuses on pro-prosecution doctrinal drift in the federal criminal justice system. 
However, if the same two extrajudicial factors were present in a state’s criminal justice system, this 
would suggest that doctrinal drift occurs at the state level as well. 
5 Ryan W. Scott, The Skeptic’s Guide to Information Sharing at Sentencing, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 
345, 381 (conducting an empirical study of district court sentencing decisions in the District of 
Massachusetts and finding that even where a written statement of reasons was mandatory, the judge 
only wrote a formal sentencing opinion or attached a hearing transcript with more than fifty sentences 
of explanation in a “tiny subset of cases”—only 1.1% of the total). 
6 Id. at 362–63. Although it is rare, some district court judges do regularly issue sentencing 
decisions in written form, including Judge Lynn Adelman of the Eastern District of Wisconsin. See, 
e.g., United States v. Jordan, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
8 In 2014, the federal prosecutors appealed the sentence imposed in 43 cases, whereas defense 
attorneys appealed the sentence imposed in 4,900 cases. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.56 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SOURCEBOOK], 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2014/Table56.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNP5-QGM9]; id. tbl.56A, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table56a.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3ZMY-VVGC]. 
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clients to zealously protect their clients’ interests.9 As a result of this 
asymmetry in the rate of appeals, appellate courts review almost 
exclusively issues decided against the defendant in the court below.10 In 
part due to the deferential standard of review,11 the appellate court affirms 
the lower court in the overwhelming majority of cases.12  
Stated a different way, when a district court imposes a sentence, four 
scenarios are possible: (1) the decision is pro-defense and the government 
appeals, (2) the decision is pro-defense and no one appeals, (3) the decision 
is pro-prosecution and no one appeals, or (4) the decision is pro-
prosecution and the defendant appeals.13 Regarding the first scenario, 
prosecutors are not obligated to appeal sentencing decisions14 and rarely do 
so.15 Prosecutors have the luxury of cherry-picking only the cases where 
they are likely to win,16 and, consequently, in the majority of cases (65%) 
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. and Scope 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“As advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”). As discussed 
below, defense attorneys are sometimes obligated to appeal even where the claims are frivolous. See 
infra text accompanying notes 132–37. 
10 Over 99% of all sentencing appeals are defense appeals. See 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 
tbls.56A, 56. 
11 Pure questions of law are reviewed de novo and all other conclusions are reviewed under a “clear 
error,” “plain error,” or “deferential abuse-of-discretion” standard of review. See, e.g., Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (overturning an appellate court’s reversal of a district court’s sentencing 
decision and holding that the standard of review that applies to a lower court’s weighing of § 3553(a) 
factors is a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”); United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 390 
(6th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the district court’s factual findings as to the sentence enhancement for “clear 
error,” and reviewing the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the application of the Guidelines 
de novo); United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1026 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that where the 
defendant fails to object to the enhancement at sentencing, the appellate court reviews the district 
court’s decision for “plain error”). 
12 See 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.M, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/FigureM.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS2W-
YMNH]. In 2014, federal appellate courts reversed only 10.2% of all sentencing decisions and affirmed 
in part and reversed in part in only 2.3% of sentencing decisions. Id. 
13 A fifth category of outcomes may include cases where the defense and prosecution come to an 
agreement, which they present to the judge and the judge accepts. I have omitted this category above for 
the sake of simplicity. For a discussion of plea agreements, see infra text accompanying note 187. 
14 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-2.170(2)(3)(a) 
(2015) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-2000-authority-
us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.170 [https://perma.cc/8N2X-U4K4]. 
15 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56A. 
16 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-2.170(2)(3)(a) (“Authorization to appeal should 
be sought only if: the sentencing decision is not supported by the law or the evidence, or the sentence is 
unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the appeal holds a reasonable prospect of a favorable 
result under the applicable standards of review.” (emphasis added)). That being said, prosecutors may 
be inclined to bring appeals where a favorable outcome is not likely if the crime is particularly 
egregious and the public has expressed outrage. DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE 
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 72 (1966) (observing that even where the 
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where the government appeals a sentencing decision, it is reversed.17 In the 
second scenario, where the decision is pro-defense and no one appeals, if 
the court imposes the sentence by oral pronouncement,18 the court’s pro-
defense legal reasoning becomes silent law that exists only in a transcript 
on PACER19 never to be cited as persuasive authority.20 The cases that fall 
into the third category are those where the lower court’s sentencing 
decision was pro-prosecution, but the defendant would have no viable 
argument for reversal. The pro-prosecution reasoning of these decisions 
also becomes silent law. Regarding the fourth outcome, when the defense 
appeals, by contrast, the majority of sentences (74.4%) are affirmed, 
resulting in a written appellate court opinion endorsing a pro-prosecution 
decision.21 In short, few written sentencing opinions searchable on 
LexisNexis and Westlaw present pro-defense reasoning, and most are pro-
prosecution appellate court opinions affirming lower court decisions.  
Consequently, when writing sentencing memoranda at the district 
court level, defense attorneys confront a dearth of written opinions decided 
in the defense’s favor. These defense attorneys are left to distinguish their 
probability of conviction is low, a prosecutor may prefer to try the case if it is a serious offense and has 
been highly publicized); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); infra text accompanying notes 36–41. 
17 Of the forty-three sentencing decisions that the government appealed, 65.1% were reversed, 
7.0% were affirmed in part and reversed in part, and 20.9% were affirmed. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 8, at tbl.56A. 
18 In rare cases, judges produce written sentencing opinions. Here the focus is on the typical case, 
where the judge explains the reasons for the sentence by oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing. 
19 Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) is an online archive where transcripts and 
other documents from federal court proceedings from 1996 to the present are made available to view, 
print, or download. JENNIFER J. BEHRENS, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW J. MICHAEL GOODSON 
LAW LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES, COURT RECORDS & BRIEFS 4 (2016), https://law.duke.edu/
sites/default/files/lib/recordsbriefs.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9MP-H3HF]; Transcripts of Federal Court 
Proceedings Nationwide to Be Available Online, U.S. COURTS (Sept. 18, 2007), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2007/09/18/transcripts-federal-court-proceedings-nationwide-be-
available-online [https://perma.cc/QN45-PX8J]; PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, 
PACER USER MANUAL FOR ECF COURTS 4 (2014), https://www.pacer.gov/documents/
pacermanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QER-HPHZ]. 
20 Scott, supra note 5, at 363 (“Often cluttered with irrelevant material, jarred by interruptions, and 
disorganized, a sentencing transcript is a poor substitute for a written opinion explaining the reasons for 
a sentence.”). 
21 Among the sentencing decisions appealed by the defense, 9.8% were reversed, 2.3% were 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and 74.4% were affirmed. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 
tbl.56. By contrast, among government appeals, 65.1% were reversed, 7.0% were affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, and 20.9% were affirmed. Id. tbl.56A. However, just looking at the percentages can be 
misleading. A comparison of the raw numbers reveals that defendants won 480 appeals in 2014, 
whereas the government won only 28. Id. tbls.56, 56A. Thus, although prosecutors won a much higher 
percentage of appeals, defendants won a significantly higher number of appeals. This suggests that the 
government is strategically selecting the cases in which it has high odds of winning. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1136 
cases from the binding precedent.22 By contrast, prosecution sentencing 
memoranda, with an abundance of favorable appellate court precedent in 
support of their arguments, are likely to be more persuasive.23 When judges 
(or their clerks) turn to Westlaw or LexisNexis to determine whether a 
certain sentence enhancement applies, they discover a mountain of pro-
prosecution precedent.24 Judges may be inclined to decide the legal issue in 
the government’s favor because most appellate court precedent supports the 
government’s position.25 As that decision is unlikely to be reversed, each 
subsequent round of appeals contributes to an increasingly prosecution-
friendly body of binding precedent.  
Part I of this Note defines and provides examples of doctrinal drift. It 
also explains how the Guidelines function and describes the role of the 
Guidelines after the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in 
United States v. Booker.26 Further, it provides examples of doctrinal drift by 
demonstrating how particular lines of doctrine have become more favorable 
to the prosecution over time. Part II identifies the causes of the one-sided 
body of law favoring the prosecution, namely (1) the lack of written district 
court sentencing decisions and (2) the disparate rate of appeals between the 
prosecution and the defense. Part III explains how this one-sided body of 
law leads to doctrinal drift with each subsequent round of appeals. Part IV 
acknowledges other factors that influence the development of case law and 
addresses the counterargument that the law is instead growing increasingly 
friendly to the defense. Finally, Part V proposes and evaluates possible 
solutions to the problem of pro-prosecution doctrinal drift in sentencing.  
22 See infra text accompanying notes 175–83. 
23 See Eric Voigt, Choosing the Best Cases: Five Reminders for New Lawyers, LEGAL WRITING 
EDITOR (Dec. 4, 2013), http://legalwritingeditor.com/2013/12/04/choosing-best-cases-five-rules-new-
lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/QC58-YDEG] (advising lawyers to avoid making assertions without citations 
to precedent because “without citations, judges might think that the stated rules and arguments are 
merely your opinions—which are irrelevant”). 
24 See infra Part II. 
25 See Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think 
About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 257, 264 (2002) (finding, based on survey of 
355 federal judges, that citation to “relevant, controlling authority” is a key component of good legal 
writing); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 643, 683 (2015) (reasoning that when appellate courts have affirmed the admission of latent 
fingerprint evidence in 24 of 25 cases, a district court “faced with this one-sided body of appellate 
fingerprint precedent might erroneously conclude that it has no discretion to exclude such evidence”). 
26 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (severing and excising the provision making the Guidelines mandatory 
because it violated the Sixth Amendment). 
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I. DOCTRINAL DRIFT AND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. What Is Doctrinal Drift?
For the purposes of this Note, doctrinal drift27 refers to systematic 
shifts in doctrine over time as a result of extrajudicial factors. This drift is 
not to be confused with the highly valued evolution of the common law. 
Indeed, scholars have posited that “case law is a continuous, never-ending 
process of evolution of legal rules that is characterized by probabilistic 
convergence toward greater efficiency and predictability.”28 Instead, this 
Note identifies the asymmetric rate of appeals between the parties and the 
courts’ practice of issuing some types of decisions by oral pronouncement 
as distorting the otherwise salutary development of the common law.29 
Even if one believes that the doctrine in a particular field of law is moving 
in a desirable direction, the development of the law in a well-functioning 
legal system should not be based on extrajudicial factors.30 
This Note is the first piece of scholarship to identify pro-prosecution 
doctrinal drift in criminal sentencing. However, it falls within a larger 
tradition of scholarship identifying extrajudicial factors that produce 
systematic shifts in doctrine over time.31 Scholars have identified doctrinal 
27 Thank you to Professor James Pfander for suggesting this term to describe the phenomenon this 
Note identifies. 
28 Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 3, at 381; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (9th ed. 2014) (arguing that efficiency, or wealth maximization, can explain the 
development of the case law). 
29 Masur & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 725 (“Regardless of one’s normative view of an area of 
law, issues like which party appeals more frequently, whether a lower court is biased, or whether courts 
are more likely to make one type of error than another should play no role in that doctrine’s 
development.”). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 643–44 (presenting a “theoretical model of how deference mistakes, coupled with 
particular asymmetries in adjudication, can generate systematic shifts in legal doctrine”); David 
Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2014) (presenting the theory that private qui tam enforcement, as opposed to public
enforcement, can systematically shift the doctrine over time); Galanter, supra note 16, at 97, 102
(positing that the body of law is skewed to favor the “repeat players” who have strategized to maximize
favorable rulemaking); Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110 (2012) (arguing
that employment discrimination law has systematically shifted in a pro-defense direction due to
extrajudicial factors); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 117 (presenting the view that when courts refuse to reach the merits of
constitutional tort claims and dispose of cases on qualified immunity grounds, constitutional rights will
degrade over time); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 470 (2011) (suggesting that
patent law has shifted in a pro-patent direction due to the asymmetry in parties’ rights to appeal to
adverse decisions); Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortion in the Evolution of
Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625, 625 (2015) (arguing that deference asymmetries in regulatory
law may push the development of the doctrine in a pro-regulated-entity direction).
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drift in various areas, including employment discrimination,32 patent law,33 
regulatory law,34 and constitutional torts.35  
In the 1970s, Professor Marc Galanter upended the usual analysis of 
how the legal system affects the parties, arguing that, in fact, it was 
differences between the parties that shaped the legal system and its rules.36 
He divided the parties into two categories: “repeat players,” who are 
involved in many similar cases over the years, and “one-shotters,” whose 
involvement in litigation is only occasional.37 One-shotters include a spouse 
in a divorce, an auto injury claimant, and a criminal defendant, whereas 
repeat players include an insurance company, a finance company, and a 
prosecutor.38 Because repeat players anticipate repeat litigation, their 
litigation strategy focuses on favorable rulemaking that protects their long-
term interests.39 For instance, a repeat player may settle a case if it 
anticipates an unfavorable rule outcome, or it may adjudicate or appeal 
those issues where it expects to generate favorable precedent.40 The logical 
consequence, Galanter suggests, is a body of precedent skewed to favor the 
repeat players.41 
Legal scholar and former U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Gertner 
built on Galanter’s insight in the context of employment discrimination, 
arguing that extrajudicial factors have produced a pro-employer shift in the 
doctrine.42 Gertner explains that most often it is the defendant–employers, 
and not plaintiff–employees, that move for summary judgment because 
plaintiff–employees bear the burden of proof.43 She further explains that, 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judges should 
state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a motion for 
summary judgment.44 In practice, however, judges write full opinions when 
granting a motion, but when denying a motion, judges facing staggering 
caseloads usually find that one word suffices: “denied.”45 Gertner argues 
32 Gertner, supra note 31. 
33 Masur, supra note 31. 
34 Wasserman, supra note 31. 
35 Jeffries, Jr., supra note 31. 
36 Galanter, supra note 16, at 97. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 98–101. 
40 Id. at 101. 
41 Id. at 102. 
42 Gertner, supra note 31, at 109–10. 
43 Id. at 114–15. 
44 Id. at 113; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
45 Gertner, supra note 31, at 113. 
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that “[t]he result of this practice—written decisions only when plaintiffs 
lose—is the evolution of a one-sided body of law.”46 If the plaintiff–
employee appeals, the appellate court will most likely affirm the lower 
court’s pro-defense decision, thereby contributing to the mountain of pro-
employer precedent.47 As the doctrine has drifted, defendant–employers 
have become increasingly likely to succeed at the summary judgment 
phase, despite persuasive evidence of discrimination.48 This Note addresses 
a doctrinal drift phenomenon similar to those that Galanter and Gertner 
identified, but focuses on the unique characteristics of the criminal 
sentencing context.  
B. How Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Work?
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide a recommended 
sentencing range based on characteristics of the defendant and the 
offense.49 It is necessary to first understand how the Guidelines operate to 
lay the foundation for the claim that the interpretation of these Guidelines 
is drifting in a pro-prosecution direction. The Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 created the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) and 
authorized the Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines.50 The 
Commission completed the initial Guidelines in April 1987, which took 
effect on November 1, 1987, and have been revised from time to time in 
the intervening years.51 The Act delegated authority to the Commission to 
specify an appropriate sentencing range for each class of convicted persons 
based on the offense behavior and offender characteristics.52 For each 
46 Id. at 114. 
47 Id. (citing Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 553 (2003) (examining appellate court 
data from 1987 to 2000, where parties in employment discrimination cases appealed unfavorable 
pretrial rulings, and finding that defendants obtained reversals in 42.28% of cases, whereas plaintiffs 
obtained reversals in only 10.66% of cases)). 
48 Id. at 121. More specifically, Gertner identifies several doctrines that have developed which 
serve to dispose of more cases at the summary judgment phase. Id. at 118–21. Under one such doctrine, 
courts have held that explicit statements of bias are sometimes mere “stray remarks” unrelated to the 
employer’s motivations for terminating an employee. Id. at 118–20. For instance, in one case, the 
employer directed a racial slur at the employee, and the court found that this was a mere stray remark, 
unconnected to the decision to terminate the employee. Id. at 120–21 (citing Shorter v. ICG Holdings, 
Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 
1217, 1226 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
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offense, the Guidelines set a “base offense level” and then provide for 
increases to that level based on “specific offense characteristics.”53 The 
Guidelines also provide for adjustments downward if, for instance, the 
defendant played a minor role54 in the offense or accepted responsibility for 
the offense by pleading guilty.55 Once the applicable increases are added to 
the base offense level and the applicable reductions are subtracted, the 
resulting figure is the “Offense Level,” located on the vertical axis of the 
Sentencing Table (Table 1).56 A criminal defendant receives “Criminal 
History Points” for prior sentences of imprisonment, and that point total 
determines the “Criminal History Category,” which is located on the 
horizontal axis of the Sentencing Table.57 To calculate the sentence range, 
one would locate the intersection of the “Offense Level” and the “Criminal 
History Category.”58 For instance, the base offense level for “extortion by 
force or threat of injury or serious damage” is eighteen.59 A defendant who 
pleaded guilty to this offense would be eligible for up to a three-level 
decrease for acceptance of responsibility.60 If a firearm was discharged in 
connection with the offense, the Guidelines would call for an increase of 
seven levels.61 The resulting offense level would be twenty-two. Assuming 
the defendant had no criminal history, he would fall in Criminal History 
Category I, and his sentencing range would be forty-one to fifty-one 
months.62 
53 See, e.g., id. § 2B3.2(b)(1) (allowing for an increase of two levels when extortion involved 
“express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping”). 
54 Id. § 3B1.2. 
55 Id. § 3E1.1. 
56 Id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. § 2B3.2(a). 
60 Id. § 3E1.1. 
61 Id. § 2B3.2(b)(3). 
62 Id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
111:1131 (2017) Doctrinal Drift 
1141 
TABLE 1: SENTENCING TABLE FROM THE 2015 U.S. SENTENCING MANUAL 
Before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker in 2005,63 
the Guidelines were mandatory.64 That meant that courts were bound to 
impose a sentence within the maximum and minimum sentences of the 
Guidelines range.65 In Booker, the Court held that the mandatory nature of 
the Guidelines denied defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial because they called on the judge to make factual determinations to 
reach the appropriate sentence.66 As a remedy, the Court elected to sever 
and excise the provision of the federal sentencing statute that made the 
63 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
64 Id. at 233. 
65 Id. at 235. 
66 Id. at 243–45. 
SENTENCING TABLE 
(in months of imprisonment) 




(0 or 1) 
II 
(2 or 3) 
III 
(4, 5, 6) 
IV 
(7, 8, 9) 
V 
(10, 11, 12) 
VI 
(13 or more) 
       
Zone A 
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
       4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
       7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
       10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
Zone C
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
       13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
Zone D
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
       16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
       19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
       22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
       25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
       28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
       31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
       34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
       37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
       40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
       43 life life life life life life 
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Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).67 This rendered the 
Guidelines advisory.68 Courts are now required to consider the Guidelines 
range, but can impose a sentence outside the range based on factors listed 
in § 3553(a), which include general categories of considerations such as the 
“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant,” “the need for the sentence imposed,” and the “need to 
provide restitution to any victims.”69  
C. Doctrinal Drift in the Interpretation of the Guidelines After Booker
Though Booker has rendered the Guidelines advisory, doctrinal drift
in the interpretation of their enhancement and reduction provisions still 
impacts sentencing outcomes. While courts can use their discretion in 
imposing a sentence below (or above) the Guidelines range, they must first 
correctly calculate the Guidelines range.70 Failure to correctly calculate the 
Guidelines range could result in reversal.71 This requirement ensures that 
the Guidelines continue to function as the “framework” for sentencing and 
serve as a “starting point” for all sentencing decisions.72 What is more, 
sentencing data indicate that judges continue to rely heavily on the 
calculated Guidelines range in sentencing decisions. Of all sentences 
imposed in 2014, 76.3% either fell within the calculated range or fell below 
the range due to a government-sponsored departure.73 Specifically, 46% of 
sentences were within the calculated Guidelines range.74 The government 
sponsored a downward departure in 30.3% of cases either because the 
defendant cooperated with law enforcement or because some other 
67 Id. at 245. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 245–46; 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) (2012). 
70 Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 
50 n.6 (2007)). 
71 Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). 
72 Id.; see also Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351 (2009) (per curiam) (“[T]he sentencing 
court must first calculate the Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the 
individual defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explaining any 
variance from the former with reference to the latter.”). 
73 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.G., http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/FigureG.pdf [https://perma.cc/N35C-72RN]; id. 
at tbl.N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2014/TableN.pdf [https://perma.cc/2269-XN7F]. 
74 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.G. Compare the 2014 figures with those from 2004, 
before Booker came down. In 2004, 72.2% of sentences fell within the Guideline range. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.26 (2004), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2004/table26pre_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S55-CDTM]. 
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mitigating factor was present.75 In 21.4% of cases, courts imposed a below-
Guidelines sentence although it was not government sponsored, and in 
2.2% of cases, courts imposed an above-Guidelines sentence.76 Therefore, 
only 23.6% of sentences fell outside of the Guidelines range without 
government sponsorship.77 Even for the cases falling outside the Guidelines 
range, if courts stray too far from the range, they risk reversal.78 In sum, 
district courts’ interpretations of the various Guidelines provisions remain 
relevant to the ultimate sentence they decide to impose, and thus any 
doctrinal drift affecting their interpretations would likewise impact the 
length of the sentences. 
D. Examples of Pro-Prosecution Doctrinal Drift
The following Section provides two examples of pro-prosecution 
doctrinal drift in sentencing. They illustrate how the law has grown 
friendlier to the prosecution with respect to (1) the interpretation of the 
§ 3B1.1 aggravating role enhancement and (2) the interpretation of the
§ 3B1.2 mitigating role reduction and the role of getaway drivers.
1. Section 3B1.1 “Otherwise Extensive” Criminal Activity
Enhancement.—According to the text of § 3B1.1(a), the four-level
enhancement applies if the defendant is an “organizer or leader of a 
criminal activity” that either “involved five or more participants” or was 
“otherwise extensive.”79 This last provision generated litigation as courts 
wrestled with what is required for criminal activity to be considered 
otherwise extensive. The Commission added Note 3 to § 3B1.1 to explain 
75 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.N. 
76 Id. fig.G. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a sentence 
nearly four-times as long as the Guidelines sentence was unreasonable); United States v. Trupin, 
475 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 552 U.S. 1089 (2008) (holding that a 
seven-month sentence for tax evasion that was thirty-four months below the bottom of the Guidelines 
range was unreasonably lenient). But see Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (holding 
that district courts are entitled to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy 
disagreement with the crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentencing disparity). In 2014, courts 
sentenced below the Guidelines range in 12,495 cases based on Booker and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.31C, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table31c.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR64-
Q9SB]. In these cases the median sentence imposed was twenty-seven months, and the median decrease 
in months from the bottom end of the Guideline range was fifteen months—a median decrease of 
35.7%. Id. 
79 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3JF7-AX5R]. 
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that the court should look to all persons involved in the offense—not just 
participants—to determine whether criminal activity is otherwise 
extensive.80 Note 3 offers an example of a case where the criminal activity 
could be considered otherwise extensive: where the criminal activity 
involved only three participants but used the services of “many outsiders.”81 
In United States v. Tai, the Seventh Circuit held that if the number of 
participants and outsiders was the sole basis for the otherwise extensive 
enhancement, a total of more than five participants and outsiders was 
necessary, but the court did not state that it would in every case be 
sufficient for the application of the enhancement.82 The court reversed the 
district court’s ruling that the enhancement applied where the total number 
of participants and outsiders was five.83 In United States v. Shearer, a 
Seventh Circuit opinion issued in 2007, the court misstated the rule from 
Tai, holding instead that “criminal activity is ‘otherwise extensive’ if it 
involves some combination of participants and unknowing outsiders 
totaling more than five.”84 What was a necessary condition in Tai became a 
sufficient condition in Shearer. 
In United States v. Caputo, decided in 2010, a district court in the 
Seventh Circuit spotted the Shearer court’s mischaracterization of Tai and 
emphasized that longstanding precedent dictated that a total of more than 
five participants and outsiders meant only that the court was permitted to 
find the scheme otherwise extensive—not that is was required to do so.85 
However, Caputo is an unpublished district court opinion that the 
prosecution did not appeal, and is cited in only one brief on Westlaw, 
which did not ultimately persuade the court.86 The district court’s attempt to 
80 Id. § 3B1.1 n.3. 
81 Id. For instance, in United States v. Olive, the defendant ran a fraudulent scheme in which he 
paid financial advisors a high commission to supply him with new clients. 804 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 329 (2016). The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the otherwise extensive prong was satisfied because the defendant’s scheme involved 
many financial advisors. Id. at 759. 
82 41 F.3d 1170, 1174–75 (7th Cir. 1994). 
83 Id. at 1175. 
84 479 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2007). 
85 2010 WL 1032621, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2010) (“Though Shearer states that ‘criminal 
activity is “otherwise extensive” if it involves some combination of participants and unknowing 
outsiders totaling more than five,’ the opinion relies on cases that hold only that a district court may find 
that a scheme is otherwise extensive based solely on the number of participants and innocent outsiders 
involved in the scheme if they number more than five.” (citing Tai, 41 F.3d at 1174–75)). The court 
held that even though the offense involved more than seven participants and outsiders, other factors, 
such as the relatively small amount of money collected, counseled against a finding that the scheme was 
otherwise extensive. Id. 
86 Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 36, United States v. Sullivan, 765 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Nos. 12-3631, 12-3670), 2013 WL 5885573, at *35; Sullivan, 765 F.3d at 719. 
111:1131 (2017) Doctrinal Drift 
1145 
correct the pro-prosecution shift in the circuit’s precedent in Shearer was 
fruitless. In United States v. Pabey, the Seventh Circuit applied the altered 
standard: that the involvement of more than five participants and outsiders 
is sufficient to render criminal activity otherwise extensive.87 The evolution 
of the interpretation of the otherwise extensive prong of § 3B1.1(a) 
demonstrates how the current of extrajudicial factors pulls the law in a pro-
prosecution direction, and even a well-meaning district court cannot steer 
the doctrine back on course.  
2. Section 3B1.2(b) Minor Role Reduction.—The change in the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation of § 3B1.2(b) also lends support to the position that 
the law evolves in a pro-prosecution direction over time. Section 3B1.2(b) 
provides that a defendant is eligible for a two-level reduction if he was a 
“minor participant” in the criminal activity.88 In its 1995 decision, United 
States v. Lowery, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to 
grant the minor role reduction under § 3B1.2(b).89 The appellate court 
reasoned that the defendant, in addition to serving as the getaway driver, 
had actively participated in the planning of the robbery by choosing the 
date and helping to make the masks.90 In United States v. Cottrell and 
United States v. Dale in 1999, and United States v. Magliocca in 2000, the 
Sixth Circuit echoed its Lowery holding, concluding that the district court 
did not clearly err in refusing to apply the minor role reduction where the 
defendant drove the getaway car and actively participated in the planning 
of the bank robbery.91  
Then in United States v. Patton in 2001, the Sixth Circuit shifted its 
understanding of the minor role reduction in a pro-prosecution direction.92 
In Patton, the Sixth Circuit held that even though the defendant learned of 
his codefendants’ criminal plot only a few hours before the robbery, his 
role as getaway driver was sufficient for the district court to find that he 
was not a minor participant.93 By 2003, when the Sixth Circuit decided 
87 664 F.3d 1084, 1097 (7th Cir. 2011). 
88 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3JF7-AX5R]. 
89 60 F.3d 1199, 1202 (6th Cir. 1995). 
90 Id. at 1201–02. 
91 United States v. Magliocca, No. 99-3916, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33874, at *4–5 (6th Cir. Dec. 
19, 2000); United States v. Cottrell, No. 97-6477, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2224, at *3–4 (6th Cir. Feb. 
9, 1999); United States v. Dale, No. 98-3687, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18317, at *12 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 
1999). 
92 14 F. App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2001). 
93 Id. 
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United States v. Brown,94 it appeared well settled that serving the “pivotal” 
role of getaway driver rendered the defendant ineligible for a minor 
participant reduction.95 The Brown decision does not cite a single case in 
the Lowery line of cases, and, even more telling, the Brown decision was a 
response to an Anders brief,96 meaning that the defendant’s attorney felt 
that any challenge to the refusal of a minor role reduction for a getaway 
driver was frivolous.97 This pro-prosecution change in the doctrine raises 
the question: What would justify the application of the minor role reduction 
if merely serving as a getaway driver without any involvement in the 
criminal plot renders a defendant ineligible?98 This line of doctrine seems to 
have slipped through the judges’ fingers, making it ever more challenging 
to prove that a minor role reduction does apply and ever easier to prove that 
it does not. In conclusion, the changes in the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 3B1.1 and the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of 
§ 3B1.2(b) suggest that criminal sentencing doctrine is drifting in a pro-
prosecution direction. The next Part will examine factors that contribute to
this drift.
II. CONTRIBUTORS TO THE ONE-SIDED BODY OF PRECEDENT
This Part will identify two contributors to the skewed body of case
law. First, judges rarely issue written sentencing decisions.99 Second, 99% 
of all appeals of sentencing decisions are defense appeals.100 Prosecutors 
can shape the legal landscape by foregoing appeal to eliminate the risk that 
an appellate court will affirm a pro-defense decision. Thus, appellate courts 
are confronted almost exclusively with defense appeals of pro-prosecution 
decisions, and, in part due to deference to the lower courts, appellate courts 
usually affirm. These factors contribute to a body of sentencing law 
composed primarily of appellate court opinions that affirm pro-prosecution 
decisions and employ reasoning that bolsters pro-prosecution arguments.  
94 55 F. App’x 753 (6th Cir. 2003). 
95 Id. at 754 (“Brown was not entitled to a reduction for being a minimal or a minor participant in 
the offenses . . . Brown’s role as the getaway driver can be said to have been pivotal or necessary to the 
success of the robberies.”). 
96 A so-called Anders brief is the brief a criminal defense attorney files if his or her client insists on 
appealing even though the attorney believes an appeal would be frivolous. See infra text accompanying 
notes 134–37. 
97 Brown, 55 F. App’x at 753–54; see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
98 See Gertner, supra note 31, at 115 (providing the parallel example of decisionmakers struggling 
to envision facts that would constitute discrimination where “case after case recites the facts that do not 
amount to discrimination”). 
99 See infra Section II.A. 
100 See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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A. Few Written District Court Opinions
Because most appellate court sentencing opinions affirm pro-
prosecution decisions, the decisions that provide persuasive pro-defense 
reasoning are primarily the district court sentencing decisions. But written 
district court sentencing decisions are rare. Federal judges in the U.S. are 
under no general mandate to issue decisions by formal, written opinion.101 
In the sentencing context, instead of producing written opinions, judges 
normally announce the reasons for the sentence in open court pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).102 An empirical study examining all of the sentencing 
decisions issued in fiscal year 2006 by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts revealed that judges wrote a formal sentencing 
opinion in less than 1.1% of cases.103 It is neither obstinacy nor lack of 
interest, but rather the high volume of sentencing decisions that compels 
judges to forego a formal written sentencing opinion in most cases.104  
Searches for district court sentencing opinions on Westlaw 
corroborate the Massachusetts study and suggest that the scarcity of such 
opinions is widespread. An example using decisions that deal with the 
§ 3B1.1 aggravating role enhancement illustrates that written district court
decisions are rare. A Westlaw query for federal court cases containing
“3B1.1” with a filter for criminal cases only, produces 7,936 results. Of
these results, only 21.86% are district court opinions, versus 78.07%
appellate court opinions.105 Thus, even though district courts issue many
101 Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law 
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 490–91 (2015) (contrasting the civil law countries of 
continental Europe, where judges are mandated to write opinions for all cases, with the United States, 
where no such mandate exists); see also United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(“It is the oral sentence which constitutes the judgment of the court, and which is authority for the 
execution of the court’s sentence. The written commitment is ‘mere evidence of such authority.’” 
(quoting Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1969))). 
102 Scott, supra note 5, at 362–63; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012) (“The court, at the time of 
sentencing shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.”); FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 128–37 (6th ed. 2013) (providing a 
suggested outline for the oral sentencing hearing); see also United States v. Cooper, 394 F.3d 172, 176 
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the sentencing court’s oral explanation of reasons was adequate). 
103 Scott, supra note 5, at 379 (analyzing sentencing decisions from fiscal year 2006, which was 
October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006). Judges are required to fill out a form called a Statement of 
Reasons when issuing a sentencing decision. § 3553(c)(2). The 1.1% figure from the study included not 
only written opinions, but also decisions where the judge attached a hearing transcript to the Statement 
of Reasons that included more than fifty sentences of explanation. Scott, supra note 5, at 379. 
104 Scott, supra note 5, at 363; see also Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.), Opinions I Should Have 
Written, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 428 (2016) (arguing that federal judges feel pressure to issue oral 
pronouncements instead of producing written opinions for efficiency’s sake). 
105 Of the 7,936 criminal cases that mention § 3B1.1, 0.06% are Supreme Court opinions. As stated 
above, 21.86% of all opinions citing § 3B1.1 are district court opinions. I filtered for reported decisions 
and discovered that an even smaller fraction of published decisions are district court decisions 
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more sentencing decisions than appellate courts review, district court 
decisions represent a small fraction of all written sentencing decisions. 
From fiscal years 2006 to 2015, district courts ruled that the § 3B1.1 
enhancement applied in 31,166 cases.106 It seems quite reasonable to 
assume that the government requested the application of § 3B1.1 in many 
more cases where the district courts elected not to apply it. Despite this, 
district courts only issued a written opinion mentioning this enhancement 
1,151 times from during the relevant time period,107 around 3.7% of the 
total applications of the rule (far less if we take into account the cases 
where the government requested a § 3B1.1 enhancement but it was found 
not to apply). In the less than 4% of cases where the district court produced 
(12.93%). However, under the modern approach, the precedential weight of published district court 
opinions may not be greater than that of unpublished district court opinions. Joseph W. Mead, Stare 
Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 804 (2012) (concluding that 
published and unpublished district court opinions are treated alike); see also FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
(establishing the rule that courts may not prohibit citation to unpublished opinions issued after January 
1, 2007). 
106 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 2015 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.18 (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZRZ-PNGV] (reporting that courts found 
§ 3B1.1 to apply in 3,260 cases in 2015); 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.18,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2014/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KCT-HC84] (3,293 cases in 2014); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2013), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2013/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/88TT-4EWJ] (3,366 cases in 2013); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2012), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2012/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UVU-UJM9] (3,377 cases in 2012); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2011), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2011/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JBN-VGHG] (3,142 cases in 2011); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2010), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2010/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ3E-DYAC] (3,006 cases in 2010); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2009), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2009/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/68Z8-YYMB] (2,985 cases in 2009); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2008), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2008/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2JQ-AMMU] (2,981 cases in 2008); UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2007), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2007/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J22Y-VE77] (2,865 cases in 2007); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 
SOURCEBOOK], http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
and-sourcebooks/2006/table18_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E62A-BVLA] (2,892 cases in 2006). 
107 Note that the U.S. Sentencing Commission data is gathered by fiscal year. Therefore, the exact 
date range examined on Westlaw was October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2015. 
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a written opinion, only some include reasoning favorable to the defense and 
many others provide pro-prosecution reasoning. The lack of written district 
court sentencing opinions translates into a dearth of case law favorable to 
the defense eclipsed by an abundance of pro-prosecution precedent, 
because most appellate court precedent favors the prosecution. The next 
Section will address why appellate court precedent consists mainly of pro-
prosecution affirmances.  
B. Asymmetric Rate of Appeals and Appellate Court Affirmances
Double jeopardy bars prosecutors from appealing criminal
convictions, but even in the sentencing arena, where prosecutors have the 
option to appeal,108 they almost never do. Of the total 75,836 sentencing 
decisions in 2014,109 the government appealed only 43.110 Defendants, by 
contrast, appealed in 4,900 cases—that is, over 100 times as many cases.111 
Of all the sentencing appeals reviewed by the courts of appeals in 2014, 
over 99% of them were defense appeals of pro-prosecution district court 
decisions.112 In sum, defendants appeal much more frequently than the 
government, and, as demonstrated below, courts usually affirm when the 
defense appeals. 
In 2014, the courts of appeal reversed only 9.8% of defense appeals 
and affirmed 74.4% of the decisions that the defense appealed.113 This is 
due in part to the deference paid to lower courts in sentencing. With the 
exception of legal conclusions by the district court, which are reviewed de 
novo,114 all other sentencing decisions are reviewed under a deferential 
standard.115 In Gall v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that 
appellate courts are to review decisions to impose a particular sentence 
under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion” standard, taking into account that 
district court judges have more experience sentencing criminal defendants 
than appellate court judges.116 Although the deference afforded to district 
108 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-2.170(2)(3)(a). 
109 In 2014, appellate courts reversed in part and affirmed in part in 2.3% of defense appeals. 2014
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56. 
110 Id. tbl.56A. 
111 Id. tbl.56. 
112 Id. tbls.56A, 56 (showing that 4,900 out of 4,943 appeals were defense appeals of pro-
prosecution district court decisions). 
113 Id. tbl.56. 
114 United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Saikaly, 
297 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
115 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); Miggins, 302 F.3d at 390; United States v. Starks, 
309 F.3d 1017, 1026 (7th Cir. 2002). 
116 552 U.S. at 52 n.7. 
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courts in sentencing is “not unlimited, it is substantial.”117 Factual findings 
with regards to the application of an enhancement are reviewed for clear 
error,118 and the appellate court reviews for plain error where the defendant 
failed to object at the trial court level.119  
The appellate court decisions that serve as pro-defense precedent 
include only the reversals of pro-prosecution decisions and the affirmances 
of pro-defense decisions. In 2014, there were 480 reversals of pro-
prosecution decisions and 9 affirmances of pro-defense decisions.120 
Therefore, out of the 4,154121 appellate sentencing decisions, only 489 serve 
as pro-defense precedent—that is 11.8% of the total. By this calculation, 
88.2% of all appellate court sentencing decisions from 2014 would be pro-
prosecution precedent, resulting in a clearly one-sided body of case law.  
The one-sided body of case law is, of course, a result of the 
extrajudicial factors identified—not careful judicial decisionmaking. The 
federal appellate courts see government appeals of pro-defense decisions 
very rarely.122 For instance, in 2014, federal appellate courts reviewed 158 
district court decisions imposing an aggravating role enhancement under 
§ 3B1.1.123 By contrast, the federal appellate courts reviewed a district
court’s decision not to impose an aggravating role enhancement only
once.124 As discussed above, the appellate court will usually find that the
district court did not clearly err in imposing the enhancement.125 What the
appellate court has to say about the district courts’ decision not to impose
the enhancement is relatively unknown, but, in all likelihood, the appellate
courts would affirm the pro-defense outcome with the same frequency.126
117 United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015). 
118 Miggins, 302 F.3d at 390. 
119 Starks, 309 F.3d at 1026. See infra text accompanying notes 192–201 for a discussion of the 
impact of the standard of review on successive rounds of appeals. 
120 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbls.56A, 56. 
121 This figure represents the sum of 3,649 affirmances and 505 reversals. Id. fig.M. For the sake of 
simplicity, it excludes the appeals that were dismissed (602) or remanded (62), as well as those that 
were affirmed in part and reversed in part (112). Id. 
122 In fact, the number of government appeals of sentencing decisions has decreased in recent 
years. In 2006, the government appealed 212 sentencing decisions and by 2014 the number of 
government sentencing appeals had dropped to 43. 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 106, at tbl.56A; 
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56A. 
123 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.57, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table57.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BE9-RFEX]. 
124 Id. tbl.58, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
and-sourcebooks/2014/Table58_revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKR5-SPUN]. 
125 Appellate courts affirmed 74.4% of defense sentencing appeals in 2014. Id. tbl.56; see supra 
text accompanying notes 113–19. 
126 D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or a Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I 
Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in 
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Although hypothetically those pro-defense appellate court cases might exist 
if the appellate courts had the opportunity to review more pro-defense 
district court opinions, in the current system, they do not. This leaves little 
precedent favorable to the defense and a wealth of pro-prosecution 
precedent. 
C. Asymmetric Rules and Incentives
The disparate rate of appeals between the prosecution and defense 
raises the question: Why do prosecutors choose not to appeal adverse 
sentencing decisions? Are they simply saving their scarce resources, or is 
this a strategic move aimed at producing precisely the one-sided body of 
case law described? This Note contends that the latter is more likely. In 
fact, this Note confirms Galanter’s categorization of prosecutors as “repeat 
players”: they anticipate repeat litigation over time and forego appeal to 
avoid unfavorable precedent that will pose challenges down the road.127 
Where a district court issues a pro-defense sentencing decision by oral 
pronouncement, if prosecutors decide not to appeal, the judge’s reasoning 
will become silent law, and they can thereby avoid the risk that the decision 
will haunt them as unfavorable circuit precedent in future cases.  
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual provides that Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
should seek authorization for appeal only if: (1) “the sentencing decision is 
not supported by the law or the evidence” or (2) “the sentence is 
unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”128 Even if one of these 
prongs is met, the Assistant U.S. Attorney is not to seek authorization to 
appeal unless “the appeal holds a reasonable prospect of a favorable result 
under the applicable standards of review.”129 Furthermore, the Department 
General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 
468 (2007). Professor Risinger describes a similar phenomenon with regards to the admissibility of the 
testimony of the prosecution’s handwriting identification experts. Id. Handwriting expert testimony is 
offered as evidence of guilt where handwriting samples recovered by law enforcement match a criminal 
defendant’s handwriting exemplars. Id. at 469. Risinger laments that appellate courts only see cases 
where the incriminating testimony was admitted and the defendant was convicted. Id. Therefore, 
“[w]hat appellate courts would have to say about the exclusion or limitation under an abuse of 
discretion standard is unknown, but it seems likely that, given appropriate hearing and findings, that 
result would be most likely be [sic] affirmed also.” Id. 
127 Galanter, supra note 16, at 101 (“Since they expect to litigate again, RPs can select to 
adjudicate (or appeal) those cases which they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules.”). 
128 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-2.170(2)(3)(a). 
129 Id. (emphasis added). To illustrate when the government might seek an appeal, in United States 
v. Nazerzadeh, the defendant was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography. 280 F.
Appx 432, 433 (5th Cir. 2008). The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 210–262 months
(17.5 years to nearly 22 years), but imposed a term of imprisonment of only 5 years (less than one-third
of the lowest recommended term), as well as lifetime supervised release. Id. The government appealed
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of Justice constrains individual prosecutors’ discretion by prohibiting them 
from appealing unless the Solicitor General authorizes the appeal.130 While 
the government’s procedures maximize its ability to shape the law to its 
advantage, defense attorneys’ ethical responsibilities, by contrast, promote 
even ill-fated litigation.  
Defense attorneys are ethically required to zealously protect their 
client’s interests.131 The Supreme Court has held that defense attorneys’ 
“role as advocate requires that [they] support [their] client’s appeal to the 
best of [their] ability.”132 Criminal defense attorneys are required to file a 
notice of appeal whenever their client requests it133 even if the appeal would 
be “wholly frivolous.”134 In the event that defense counsel believes that an 
appeal would be frivolous, she must prepare an Anders brief, where she 
points to anything in the record that could support the appeal.135 Defense 
counsel must then provide this brief to the client to raise any additional 
points the client wishes.136 At that point, the court reviews the brief and 
makes a determination as to whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.”137 
Thus, where U.S. Attorney policy dissuades prosecutors from appealing, 
defense attorneys are required to appeal when their client requests it.  
In addition to the contrasting rules that govern the attorneys’ decisions 
to appeal, individual criminal defendants and the government have 
dramatically different incentives driving their decisions to appeal. 
Individual criminal defendants are concerned only with their own sentence: 
Will they face imprisonment or probation? If they will go to prison, how 
long will they be deprived of their freedom? Accordingly, the stakes for 
criminal defendants in a single case are high.138 The government, by 
contrast, has the luxury of taking a macro approach, strategizing to shape 
the sentence, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed reasoning that the district court had explained its downward 
departure on the grounds that the defendant suffered from psychological problems. Id. at 433–34. 
130 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 2-2.121. 
131 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
132 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
133 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (“We have long held that a lawyer who 
disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is 
professionally unreasonable.”). 
134 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. In 2014, defense attorneys filed 1,646 Anders briefs in federal appellate courts. 2014
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56. 
138 Galanter, supra note 16, at 98. 
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the landscape of the law in the long term.139 The government can carefully 
select the cases where an appeal would move the law in a favorable 
direction for the prosecution.140 It is therefore no surprise that of the forty-
three cases that the government appealed in 2014, the government won 
twenty-eight, or 65.1%, of them.141 The government is willing to make a 
trade-off, sacrificing the opportunity to appeal an adverse sentencing 
decision in an individual case to avoid the risk that the appellate court will 
affirm that pro-defense decision. In this way, where the district court’s 
reasoning would help the defense, the government can avoid having that 
reasoning enshrined in an appellate court decision.142 This results in a body 
of doctrine overwhelmingly composed of appellate court affirmances of 
pro-prosecution decisions. 
By contrast, criminal defense attorneys’ zealous advocacy on appeal 
can have the perverse effect of contributing to the pro-prosecution skew of 
the case law. As discussed above, in 74.4% of all defense-initiated appeals 
in 2014, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s pro-prosecution 
decision.143 Therefore, in 2014 alone, defense appeals generated 3,645 pro-
prosecution appellate court decisions.144 In this way, when defense 
attorneys advocate for the interests of one individual client, they may 
actually contribute to a body of precedent that disadvantages criminal 
defendants generally.  
This Part has outlined the contributors to the one-sided body of 
precedent: the lack of written district court opinions and disparate rates of 
appeal between the prosecution and defense due to their divergent 
incentives. Part III will discuss how the one-sided body of precedent results 
in pro-prosecution doctrinal drift over time. 
III. CONTRIBUTORS TO DOCTRINAL DRIFT OVER TIME
Not only does the body of law interpreting the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines consist primarily of pro-prosecution appellate court affirmances 
of district court decisions, but the doctrine itself actually drifts in a pro-
prosecution direction with each subsequent round of appeals. When 
139 See Masur, supra note 25, at 717 (reasoning that if a party is able to carefully appeal to produce 
more favorable precedents, that party “might be capable, over time, of shifting the law in a direction 
favorable to its interests”). 
140 Galanter, supra note 16, at 101. 
141 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56A. The government’s success rate of 65.1% must be 
viewed in contrast to the average rate of reversal, 10.2%, as well as the rate of reversal on defense 
appeal, 9.8%. Id. fig.M; id. tbl.56. 
142 Galanter, supra note 16, at 101. 
143 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56. 
144 Id. 
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defense attorneys write sentencing memoranda, their research turns up little 
pro-defense case law,145 and this lack of favorable precedent may 
discourage defense attorneys from even raising objections to sentence 
enhancements. By contrast, when U.S. Attorneys prepare their sentencing 
memoranda, a cursory search on Westlaw or LexisNexis produces a wealth 
of pro-prosecution binding appellate court precedent to support their 
arguments.146 A prosecution memorandum complete with citations to 
binding authority is likely to be more persuasive to a district court judge 
than a defense memorandum making unsupported assertions. When the 
judge sides with the prosecution and the appellate court affirms the district 
court decision based on deferential review, the cycle repeats itself ad 
infinitum and the law grows increasingly favorable to the prosecution.  
A. The Defense Attorney’s Tools and Their Limitations
A survey of persuasive authorities available to a defense attorney 
drafting a sentencing memorandum reveals the shortcomings of each type 
of authority. As demonstrated in the previous Section, the overwhelming 
majority of appellate court precedent reflects pro-prosecution reasoning. 
This Section will show that written district court opinions are rare, 
nonbinding, and more likely to reflect exceptional rather than run-of-the-
mill cases,147 and neither transcripts on PACER nor Statement of Reasons 
forms provide a clear picture of the district court judge’s reasoning.148  
In contrast to federal appellate precedent, which is binding on all of 
the lower courts in the circuit,149 district court precedent is to be considered 
only to the extent that its reasoning is persuasive.150 In other words, district 
courts are free to diverge from intra-district precedent, and do so with little 
hesitation.151 Another limitation of district court opinions is that they are 
not representative of the various judicial points of view or the variety of 
cases. Because judges are not required to issue their sentencing decisions in 
writing, some judges write many criminal sentencing opinions, whereas 
other judges write few.152 Furthermore, written criminal sentencing 
145 See supra Part II. 
146 See supra Part II. 
147 Scott, supra note 5, at 363. 
148 Id. 
149 See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that circuit law binds 
all courts within a circuit, including all of the inferior courts in the circuit as well as future circuit 
panels). 
150 Mead, supra note 105, at 802. 
151 Id. 
152 Scott, supra note 5, at 366–67. According to a Westlaw query, Judge Lynn Adelman of the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin has mentioned aggravating role enhancement § 3B1.1 in fifteen 
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opinions may reflect outlier points of view, because judges have a special 
motivation to produce a written opinion when they suspect that other 
judges might disagree with their reasoning.153 Furthermore, due to time 
constraints, judges must be selective in choosing the cases for which they 
will issue a written sentencing opinion.154 Judges are more likely to select 
outlier cases that are extraordinary or groundbreaking, and the result is that 
written district court sentencing opinions provide model reasoning for 
exceptional sentencing questions, but little guidance for garden-variety 
sentencing issues.155 Lastly, because written district court sentencing 
opinions are rare, finding a closely analogous case is unlikely.  
Most district court sentencing decisions are issued by oral 
pronouncements,156 which are recorded in transcripts and uploaded to 
PACER, but these have drawbacks of their own. Obtaining transcripts of 
analogous cases on PACER is inefficient and can be costly,157 and, because 
the judge’s reasoning is not clearly presented in oral hearing transcripts, 
their value as persuasive authority is doubtful.158 The search feature on 
PACER is designed for those who know exactly what case they are looking 
for, not for browsing by topic or key word. In fact, a search on PACER for 
criminal matters only has the following fields: region, case number, case 
title, date filed, date closed, party name, and party role.159 It does not permit 
plain language or Boolean searches.160 Fortunately, federal defenders and 
private attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act have free 
PACER access.161 For privately retained defense attorneys,162 however, the 
sentencing decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Tesillos, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040 (E.D. Wis. 2013). 
By contrast, a more senior judge in the same district, Judge J.P. Stadtmueller, has authored only three 
opinions mentioning § 3B1.1. See Culbert v. United States, No. 07-CV-046, 2008 WL 2062324 (E.D. 
Wis. May 13, 2008); Payan v. United States, No. 07-CV-806, 2008 WL 582797 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 29, 
2008); Kruppstadt v. United States, No. 04-CV-443, 2007 WL 2042251 (E.D. Wis. July 11, 2007); see 
also Gertner, supra note 104, at 438 (commending Judges Mark Bennett, Lynn Adelman, John Gleason, 
and Jack Weinstein for consistently authoring written sentencing opinions). 
153 Scott, supra note 5, at 367. 
154 Id. at 366. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 362–63. 
157 For instance, a 300-page transcript would cost $30. PACER, ELECTRONIC ACCESS FEE 
SCHEDULE (1), (2) (2013), https://www.pacer.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf [https://perma.cc/K952-
F7E7]. 
158 See Scott, supra note 5, at 363. 
159 PACER USER MANUAL, supra note 19, at 16, 19. 
160 A Boolean search uses key words or phrases and connectors like: AND, OR, and /s. 
161 FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 157, at (10). The federal defenders are exempt from PACER fees 
because they are authorized by the Criminal Justice Act. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2) (2012). 
162 In 1998, criminal defendants retained private representation in 33.4% of felony cases and 18.7% 
of misdemeanor cases. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1156 
cost of browsing for analogous cases may be prohibitive. PACER users 
cannot see the document until they pay for it.163 It is impractical to pay for a 
document—at $0.10 a page—before knowing whether it will be helpful.164  
Given the structure of the PACER system, it is unlikely that a criminal 
defense attorney will find a transcript of an oral sentencing decision on 
PACER that is both factually analogous to his case and has a defense-
favorable outcome. On the off chance that she does, it is unclear what, if 
any, persuasive effect a citation to this transcript would have on a district 
court judge. Professor Ryan Scott, who has published several articles on 
criminal sentencing, argues that hearing transcripts “do a poor job of 
capturing the judge’s reasoning.”165 A judge’s oral pronouncement, Scott 
points out, is intended for the people in the courtroom: mainly the 
defendant, the lawyers, the witnesses, and those observing from the 
gallery.166 The judge issuing an oral ruling does not express his or her 
reasoning in a methodical manner so that future judges facing similar issues 
might apply the same reasoning. Instead, Scott asserts, because oral 
hearings are “often cluttered with irrelevant material, jarred by interruption, 
and disorganized,” they are a “poor substitute for a written opinion 
explaining the reasons for a sentence.”167  
Likewise, judges are required to complete a Statement of Reasons 
form in accordance with § 3553(c)(2), but these forms are not useful as 
persuasive authority.168 The Statement of Reasons is a four-page form 
where the judge can check boxes to indicate whether the sentence is above, 
below, or within the Guidelines range, and to indicate the reasons for the 
sentence using categories like “Victim Impact” or “Remorse/Lack of 
Remorse.”169 The form also includes a space for the judge to provide a 
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7N9G-QAS6]. 
163 FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 157, at (1). The fee for most case documents is capped at $3.00, 
even if they exceed 30 pages, but there is no price cap for transcripts of federal proceedings. Id. at (1), 
(2). 
164 Id. 
165 Scott, supra note 5, at 363. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2012) (“The court shall provide a transcription or other appropriate 
public record of the court’s statement of reasons, together with the order of judgment and commitment, 
to the Probation System and to the Sentencing Commission, and, if the sentence includes a term of 
imprisonment, to the Bureau of Prisons.”). 
169 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, AO 245B JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE, STATEMENT OF 
REASONS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/706/download [https://perma.cc/5HHC-BRCQ]; Scott, 
supra note 5, at 378. 
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narrative description of the reasons for the sentence.170 A written narrative 
description is required in two types of cases: (1) cases where the sentence 
imposed falls outside the Guidelines range and (2) cases where the sentence 
carries a term of imprisonment greater than twenty-four months.171 Judges 
sometimes meet this requirement by attaching a transcript of the sentencing 
hearing or, in rare cases,172 a written sentencing opinion.173 The Statement 
of Reasons forms are generally not disclosed to the public.174 Therefore, 
they are not made available on Westlaw or LexisNexis, and attorneys 
cannot cite them as persuasive authority. Even if Statements of Reasons 
forms were publicly available, checked boxes on a form do not provide 
deep insights into the judge’s reasoning. In short, district court opinions, 
transcripts on PACER, and Statement of Reasons forms do not compensate 
for the lack of pro-defense appellate court precedent.  
B. Attorneys’ Reactions to the Lack of Pro-Defense Precedent
This Section will demonstrate that the lack of pro-defense case law
can weaken defense sentencing memoranda, give prosecutors greater 
leverage in plea negotiations, and cause defense attorneys to abandon 
potentially meritorious, but unsupported arguments. When faced with a 
landscape of pro-prosecution precedent, defense attorneys’ best strategy 
may be to distinguish their case from cases with pro-prosecution outcomes. 
However, this is not as persuasive as citing analogous binding circuit court 
authority.175 Suppose a defense attorney plans to challenge the application 
of a § 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous weapon enhancement to her client’s drug 
offense. To succeed she will have to show that “it is clearly improbable that 
the weapon was connected with the offense.”176 Imagine that in her client’s 
case, police found the gun in the bedroom closet and recovered distribution 
170 Scott, supra note 5, at 378. 
171 § 3553(c)(1)–(2); see also Scott, supra note 5, at 378 (noting that judges sometimes write on the 
back of the form or attach additional documents, such as transcripts or a sentencing opinion, to fulfill 
this requirement). 
172 See supra Section II.A. 
173 Scott, supra note 5, at 378. 
174 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (2001) (“[T]he forms entitled ‘Statement of 
Reasons’ . . . will not be disclosed to the public.”); Scott, supra note 5, at 378. 
175 In the employment discrimination context, Gertner discusses the effect of a one-sided body of 
law on the way judges view cases. Gertner, supra note 31, at 115. She argues, “If case after case recites 
the facts that do not amount to discrimination, it is no surprise that the decisionmakers have a hard time 
envisioning the facts that may well comprise discrimination.” Id. 
176 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3JF7-AX5R]. 
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quantities of illegal drugs in the garage.177 There are a few cases where the 
appellate courts found that the district court clearly erred in applying the 
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, but the facts of those cases are so exceptional
that, if anything, they make the defense attorney’s challenge look weaker
by comparison, rather than stronger.178 For instance, the defense attorney
would be hard pressed to persuasively analogize her case to United States
v. Franklin.179 There, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court’s
application of the enhancement was clear error because the defendant’s
weapon was a “little pocket knife” he used to strip wires in his job as an
electrician and the police did not find it necessary to confiscate the
weapon.180
The defense attorney’s tools may, therefore, be limited to 
distinguishing her case from more egregious cases where the appellate 
courts affirmed the application of the enhancement. She could argue that 
unlike the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Booker, where the 
government’s informant saw an AK-47 on the couch next to the defendant 
during controlled crack buys,181 her client’s weapon was merely a handgun 
stowed in the closet where it did not pose an immediate threat of violence. 
However, Booker provides no guidance as to what set of facts might 
present too tenuous a connection between a gun and drugs. Therefore, this 
comparison merely demonstrates that this defendant’s case is not quite as 
bad as Booker. However, it does not logically follow that the enhancement 
is inapplicable to this defendant’s offense.182 Thus, the lack of analogous 
pro-defense case law can affect the relative strength of defense sentencing 
memoranda.  
Defense attorneys are at a further disadvantage when preparing 
sentencing memoranda because they are forced to reinvent the wheel every 
time they present an argument. When the government makes a novel 
argument as to the interpretation of the Guidelines that succeeds at the 
district court level, the defense will often appeal, and, in the majority of 
cases, the appellate court will endorse the government’s argument, 
177 Facts taken from United States v. Perez, 581 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2009), and modified slightly. 
178 See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 484 F.3d 912, 913–16 (7th Cir. 2007). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 United States v. Booker, 248 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2001). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 460 (7th Cir. 2012). In Johns, the defendant 
argued that the § 3A1.1 vulnerable victims enhancement did not apply. Id. He attempted to distinguish 
his case from other more severe cases by pointing out that his victims only experienced financial 
distress, whereas in other cases where the enhancement applied the victims experienced financial 
distress in addition to other vulnerabilities (e.g., age and alcoholism). Id. The court rejected this 
argument, and concluded that the enhancement applied. Id. 
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permanently entrenching it in a written opinion.183 When a defense attorney 
suggests a novel interpretation of the Guidelines and manages to persuade 
the district court, that is usually the end of the story. In most cases the 
district court will issue an oral ruling, the government will not appeal,184 
and the defense attorney’s innovative argument will be forgotten, existing 
only in a transcript. As a consequence, every time a defense attorney wants 
to present this argument, it will be novel to the judge even if her colleagues 
down the hall or across the country have already endorsed it in an oral 
ruling.185 Unlike the government attorneys who can support their arguments 
with a citation to circuit authority sanctioning them,186 defense attorneys 
have to expend effort persuading the judge of the argument’s validity as if 
it were the first time every time.  
The one-sided body of precedent may give prosecutors greater 
leverage in plea negotiations as well. Prosecutors can be more confident 
that the courts will accept their interpretations of the Guidelines because 
they have appellate court precedent to support their assertions, whereas 
defense attorneys cannot be as convinced that their arguments will succeed. 
This confidence disparity may give prosecutors the upper hand in plea 
negotiations with defense attorneys. For instance, in exchange for a guilty 
plea, a prosecutor may agree that a certain “sentencing factor does or does 
not apply,” and once the court accepts the plea agreement, that 
recommendation binds the court.187 The defense attorney may be somewhat 
hopeful that he can persuade the court that an enhancement does not apply 
without the prosecutor’s agreement. However, because the defense attorney 
has no assurance that his argument will succeed, accepting the plea 
agreement may be worth avoiding the risk of failure. 
Finally, defense attorneys faced with a dearth of favorable precedent 
may be discouraged from even challenging the applicability of sentence 
enhancements. Lawyers are trained not to make an assertion unless they 
have case law to back it up.188 In this vein, a survey of federal judges 
revealed that their principal complaint about attorneys’ writing was their 
failure to effectively use “relevant, controlling authority” to support their 
183 See supra Section II.B. 
184 See supra Part II. 
185 Criminal defense attorneys can combat this by sharing successful arguments with one another at 
federal criminal defense conferences, for instance. 
186 Risinger, supra note 126, at 467, 473 (observing that prosecutors tend to bolster their arguments 
with string cites to appellate court decisions). 
187 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
188 Voigt, supra note 23 (advising lawyers to avoid making assertions without citations to 
precedent because “without citations, judges might think that the stated rules and arguments are merely 
your opinions—which are irrelevant”). 
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position.189 Many federal districts’ local rules even require that arguments 
be supported by “citations of authority.”190 Therefore, defense attorneys 
who cannot find case law to support their arguments may not make them at 
all. Over time, defense attorneys may become discouraged by the ever-
growing heap of pro-prosecution circuit court precedent.191 
C. Whose Brief Is More Likely to Persuade the Judge?
District court judges are more likely to decide a case in accordance 
with appellate court precedent than to go against the grain, and because the 
majority of appellate court precedent favors the prosecution, pro-defense 
arguments are at a great disadvantage. To understand how district courts 
interpret appellate court holdings, it is crucial to first understand the impact 
of the standard of review applied by the appellate courts. Professor 
Jonathan Masur argues that judges tend to ignore the deference paid by the 
prior reviewing court and are prone to view all precedent through “non-
deferential prisms.”192 For example, suppose an appellate court issues an 
opinion holding that the district court did not “clearly err” in applying the 
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous weapon enhancement193 when the gun is in the
closet and the drugs are in the garage.194 Masur’s argument suggests that a
future judge deciding a similar case is likely to misinterpret the holding as
expressing the rule that when the gun is in the closet and the drugs are in
the garage, the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applies.195 Of course, the
appellate court is not declaring the district court’s holding as the rule,
189 Robbins, supra note 25, at 264 (presenting the results of a survey of federal judges, which 
reveal that “first and foremost, judges are critical of lawyers’ inability to use relevant controlling 
authority to their advantage”). 
190 See, e.g., N.D. ILL. CRIM. R. 1(b) (“A contested motion shall be accompanied by a short, concise 
brief in support of the motion, together with citations of authority.” (emphasis added)); E.D. VA. CRIM. 
R. 12(A) (“All motions, unless otherwise directed by the Court, shall be accompanied by a written brief
setting forth a concise statement of the facts and supporting reasons, along with a citation of the
authorities upon which the movant relied.” (emphasis added)).
191 Risinger, supra note 126, at 469 (noting that from 2003 to 2007 all courts affirmed the 
admission of handwriting identification expert testimony and the number of decisions where the 
admissibility of handwriting testimony was contested decreased rapidly—from eighteen between 2002 
and 2003 to only one in 2007). Contra Gertner, supra note 31, at 115 (indicating that although one 
might expect litigants to realize that their chances of success are low and stop filing employment 
discrimination suits, the record reveals that litigants continue filing their claims regardless). 
192 Masur, supra note 25, at 706–07. 
193 See, e.g., United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We review factual 
findings under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear error; we give due deference to the application of the 
Guidelines to the facts; we review purely legal questions de novo.” (quoting United States v. Vaziri, 
164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir. 1999))). 
194 See supra text accompanying note 177. 
195 Masur, supra note 25, at 706–07. 
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because if the appellate court had the opportunity to make a determination 
in the first instance, it may have found that the enhancement did not apply. 
There are several reasons why this type of mistake is commonplace: (1) 
judges tend to focus on the holding of a case, as opposed to the standard of 
review under which it was decided, (2) judges may—correctly or 
incorrectly—believe that the standard of review did not factor into the 
appellate court’s decision, and (3) evaluating precedent as nondeferential is 
less “cognitively taxing” than evaluating precedent in light of the standard 
of review applied.196  
Masur provides an example of twenty-five cases discussing the 
admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence.197 In twenty-four out of twenty-
five cases, the defendant had appealed the admission of the evidence and 
the appellate court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the evidence.198 Of course, if the appellate court reviewed an 
instance where the district court excluded the evidence, it may have also 
found that the court did not abuse its discretion. Despite this, a district court 
may not feel free to disregard these twenty-four cases and use its discretion 
to exclude the evidence.199  
Furthermore, when a judge issues a decision diverging from 
precedent, she must expend additional effort and make a strong case to 
support the departure. When judges rely on precedent, they can use the 
information and reasoning that courts have produced in previous cases.200 
By contrast, a decision diverging from precedent requires more intellectual 
effort and a greater time investment by the judge, because the judge must 
start from square one investigating the innovative aspects of the case and 
the legal arguments presented.201 Departing from precedent has another 
important cost: a judge who deviates from appellate case law may face 
criticism by colleagues, extrajudicial institutions, and the public at large.202 
Consequently, a judge issuing an opinion that does not coincide with the 
pattern of appellate court cases will find it necessary to make strong 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 683. 
198 Id. In the twenty-fifth case, the government sought a writ of mandamus directing the district 
court to admit the latent fingerprint evidence, which the court granted. Id. at 683 & n.202 (citing In re 
United States, 614 F.3d 661, 662 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
199 Masur, supra note 25, at 683. Risinger provides another example in the area of handwriting 
identification expertise. Risinger, supra note 126, at 469. He notes that courts deciding whether to admit 
handwriting identification evidence produced “highly authority driven” opinions supported by string 
cites to appellate court precedent. Id. 
200 Ponzetto, supra note 3, at 384. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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arguments for why this case should come out differently—a labor-intensive 
task.203 Moreover, judges may be particularly inclined to conform to 
existing practice in criminal sentencing because 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 
calls on them to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”204 
Thus, when judges are confronted with a prosecution brief citing to an 
abundance of favorable binding appellate court precedent and a defense 
brief with sparse citations to persuasive authority, they will likely tend to 
conform their decisions to the binding precedent and side with the 
prosecution.205 The result is that with each subsequent round of appeals, the 
law inches further and further in a pro-prosecution direction.  
IV. OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY INFLUENCE JUDICIAL
DECISIONMAKING AND CONCERNS 
This Note contends that two extrajudicial factors—lack of written 
district court opinions and disparate rate of appeals—contribute to doctrinal 
drift in a pro-prosecution direction. However, a confluence of other factors 
may influence sentencing decisions, including judges’ political and 
ideological leanings,206 their desire to avoid reversal,207 and their aim to 
203 Id. 
204 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012). 
205 See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, No. CR 13–2643 JB, 2014 WL 34211063, at *6 (D.N.M. 
July 8, 2014) (rejecting the argument that the § 2K2.1(b)(6) firearm enhancement does not apply when 
the defendant possesses only a small amount of drugs and citing four appellate court cases that also 
rejected that position). 
206 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.8 (2010) (survey of federal district court judges revealing 
that for certain offenses—child pornography possession and receipt and drug trafficking of crack 
cocaine—a majority of judges believe the sentencing range is too high); Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. 
Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 405, 431 (2011) (concluding that judges appointed by Democrats are more likely than their 
Republican counterparts to depart downward in criminal sentencing); Max M. Schanzenbach & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory 
and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 52–53 (2007) (analyzing data and concluding that Democratic 
judges, as compared to Republican judges, are more likely to impose lower sentences for street crimes, 
and that Democratic judges are particularly lenient when the appellate panel is composed mostly of 
Democratic appointees); Scott, supra note 5, at 373–74 (asserting that judges have “deep disagreements 
about sentencing values and priorities”); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some 
Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990) (suggesting that 
appellate courts may be prejudiced against defendants because they have been found guilty of a crime). 
207 See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 941, 984 (1995) (stating that judicial reversal “reflects professional criticism by other
professionals”); Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 206, at 431 (analyzing data of district court
sentencing decisions and concluding that, in some instances, district court judges may adjust their
decisions in order to avoid reversal).
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preserve the reviewability of their rulings,208 among others.209 At least some 
of these factors may either exacerbate or curb the effects of the 
extrajudicial factors discussed above that produce pro-prosecution doctrinal 
drift, but none appears to cancel them out. 
Professor Kate Stith has argued that appellate court criminal precedent 
evolves in a pro-defendant direction—not a pro-prosecution direction—
because double jeopardy prevents the government from appealing.210 Stith 
argues that appellate courts will commit errors in some percentage of 
cases.211 For instance, they will affirm the admission of a confession when 
they should reverse (“pro-government error”) and they will reverse the 
admission of a confession when they should affirm (“pro-defendant 
error”).212 Because the government does not appeal, it bears the burden of 
error at the district court level.213 Further, because the appellate court 
reviews primarily defense appeals, Stith argues that the number of pro-
defendant errors will be much greater than the number of pro-government 
errors, thereby causing the law to shift in a pro-defendant direction.214  
Stith’s argument rests on the assumption that appellate courts are 
equally likely to erroneously reverse a decision as they are to erroneously 
affirm a decision. Her argument fails to take into account the deference 
paid to lower courts and does not address the unique characteristics of the 
sentencing context. An appellate court often reviews the lower court’s 
sentencing decisions for clear error.215 As a result, the appellate court is 
likely to affirm in many cases where, if the appellate court were deciding 
the issue in the first instance, it would issue the opposite ruling. In fact, the 
rate of reversal is very low at only 10.2%.216 Therefore, appellate courts are 
much more likely to affirm a decision that departs from the legal standard 
208 Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: 
A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 520 n.22 (1973). 
209 Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do 
They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341, 389–90 (2002) (asserting that an advantage to ruling in favor of the 
defense is that the decision will not be appealed and that finality reduces the caseload of the courts). 
210 Stith, supra note 206, at 7, 17; see also Joshua Steinglass, The Justice System in Jeopardy: The 
Prohibition on Government Appeals of Acquittals, 31 IND. L. REV. 353, 382 (1998) (arguing that the 
double jeopardy prohibition on government appeals causes the doctrine to shift in a pro-defendant 
direction and recommending that the government be permitted to appeal erroneous acquittals). 
211 Stith, supra note 206, at 17. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 18. 
214 Id. at 17. 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 114–19. 
216 In 2014, the appellate courts reversed criminal sentencing decisions in 10.2% of cases and 
affirmed in part and reversed in part in 2.3% of cases. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.M. 
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than they are to reverse such a decision, meaning that, in fact, the 
asymmetric rate of appeals favors the government.  
Further, as discussed above, unlike in decisions to acquit or convict, 
where the government cannot appeal because of double jeopardy 
prohibitions, the government can appeal adverse sentencing decisions.217 
Therefore, Stith’s assertion that the government bears the burden of error in 
the lower court is inapplicable in the sentencing context. As written district 
court sentencing opinions are rare, the government bears little risk of 
unfavorable precedent that will affect future cases.218 Because the 
government can choose not to appeal criminal sentencing rulings, it can 
make a strategic decision to leave district court pro-defense errors 
unchallenged.  
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This Part will survey potential solutions to doctrinal drift to prevent 
the law from morphing into an unrecognizable body of pro-prosecution 
precedent. Ultimately, judicial skepticism of doctrinal developments may 
be the only workable solution. One option is to require judges to generate 
more written opinions, but this alternative does not seem feasible. Scholars 
have been urging judges to write full sentencing opinions for years.219 
However, judges must issue a high volume of sentencing decisions and 
producing a written opinion is time-consuming.220 Therefore, requiring 
written opinions could hamper the speedy resolution of disputes or cause 
judges to give short shrift to other written opinions.221 
Another alternative is for judges to keep an open mind as to what 
constitutes persuasive authority and give weight to citations to Statements 
of Reasons or oral hearing transcripts, but due to the limitations of these 
sources, this potential solution seems unworkable. As discussed above, the 
Statement of Reasons provides little guidance to future jurists facing 
similar factual scenarios because judges simply check boxes on a standard 
217 United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980) (“From this it follows that the 
Government’s taking a review of respondent’s sentence does not in itself offend double jeopardy 
principles just because its success might deprive respondent of the benefit of a more lenient sentence.”). 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 101–07. 
219 Scott, supra note 5, at 362 (“For years scholars have been urging sentencing judges to issue full-
fledged published sentencing decisions more frequently.” (first citing Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, 
Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54–55 
(2007); then citing Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial 
Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 940 (1996); and then citing Steven L. Chanenson, 
Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 147 (2006))). 
220 Scott, supra note 5, at 363. 
221 Cohen, supra note 101, at 523. 
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form to indicate the reasons for a sentence.222 Oral hearing transcripts are 
similarly unsuitable because they do not clearly articulate a judge’s 
reasoning and are intended more for the parties in the courtroom than for 
future judges.223  
Professor Ryan Scott analyzed the feasibility of an “open access 
approach” where defense attorneys and judges would enjoy open access to 
a database of past sentencing information.224 Under this approach, defense 
attorneys and prosecutors could include citations to sentencing outcomes in 
the database in briefs and at sentencing hearings.225 By presenting judges 
with similar cases in which below-Guidelines sentences were imposed, 
defense attorneys could persuade judges they would not be going out on a 
limb if they imposed the requested sentence.226 However, the open access 
approach is useful primarily to promote inter-judge consistency in the 
length of sentences. Its utility is limited in addressing the problem 
identified in this Note because it does nothing to preserve district court 
judges’ reasoning for electing not to impose a particular enhancement or 
opting to grant a reduction.  
The best solution may simply be for courts to be aware of the pro-
prosecution skew of the precedent and to view the doctrine with 
skepticism.227 The two examples of pro-prosecution shifts in the doctrine 
identified here could have been avoided if judges and their clerks carefully 
researched not only the most recent precedent but older precedent as 
well.228 Likewise, the risk of pro-prosecution doctrinal drift is reduced if 
courts are wary of string cites in prosecution briefs and do not take for 
granted the “rule” that they present. Lastly, thoroughly examining the text 
of the Guidelines before reviewing the case law interpreting it could serve 
to reign in doctrinal drift.  
CONCLUSION 
This Note demonstrates that pro-prosecution doctrinal drift is the 
result not of careful judicial reasoning, but of extrajudicial factors, 
principally (1) the disparate rate of appeals between the defense and 
222 Scott, supra note 5, at 378. 
223 See supra text accompanying notes 156–66. 
224 Scott, supra note 5, at 349, 399–400. 
225 Id. at 399. 
226 Id. at 399–400. 
227 See Masur, supra note 25, at 730 (“[I]t may simply be appropriate for courts . . . to view 
particular doctrines with greater skepticism because of the possibility that those doctrines have evolved 
in a biased fashion due to deference mistakes.”). 
228 See supra text accompanying notes 79–97. 
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prosecution and (2) the lack of written decisions at the district court level. 
Because 99% of appeals are defense appeals, appellate courts almost 
exclusively review pro-prosecution district court decisions. In part due to 
deference, appellate courts affirm the majority of these decisions. As a 
result, the body of appellate court sentencing precedent is composed 
primarily of pro-prosecution appellate court opinions affirming district 
court decisions. This problem is further exacerbated in the sentencing 
context because district courts usually issue sentencing decisions by oral 
pronouncement. The opinions that are most likely to present pro-defense 
reasoning are district court decisions, but written sentencing decisions at 
this level are rare. If a district court judge interprets a subsection of the 
Guidelines in a manner that is favorable to the defense, that reasoning will 
most likely become silent law that serves the particular defendant but has 
no generative force.  
When writing sentencing memoranda aimed at persuading the court 
that a sentence reduction should apply or that an enhancement should not 
apply, defense attorneys have little authority to support their arguments. 
Prosecutors, on the other hand, have a plethora of case law to choose from 
to bolster their position, and because of this, judges reviewing these briefs 
are likely to find the prosecution’s more persuasive. As a result, circuit 
doctrine will grow increasingly prosecution-friendly with each subsequent 
round of appeals. The best response to prevent the law from surreptitiously 
slipping through judges’ fingers may simply be to draw judges’ attention to 
the fact that sentencing doctrine has a tendency to drift in a pro-prosecution 
direction and call on them to view the doctrine with a skeptical eye.  
